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Abstract — Club goods (also called toll goods) are collective goods with the possibility of excluding 
individuals who fail to contribute.The possibility of exclusion  from the consumption of the public good 
has conflicting effects on welfare : on one hand it reduces the incentives to free ride, on the other hand it 
reduces the number of beneficiaries of the public good. Many clubs require a minimum number of 
members to be able to provide their activity (e.g., a farmer association, etc.). This step-level component 
can either be considered as a threshold for the provision of the club good itself, or as a threshold for 
maintaining some activity within an existing club. While previous experimental research focused on 
fundraising to provide non-existing public goods, we adopt in this work the second interpretation: the 
club good already exists and there is a step level for it’s maintenance. Aggregate contributions above the 
threshold constitute an improvement of the club services that benefit only to the club members. The 
game admits two Nash equilibria: to contribute the provision point and to contribute nothing. The first 
equilibrium involves a coordination problem. Furthermore, the game involves a social dilemma, since 
the social optimum is attained if all agents contribute their endowment. Our baseline treatment is a step 
level public good game with linear payoff above the threshold without money back guarantee. We 
compare three levels of provision point. Non-contributors are excluded but are informed about the 
amount of good produced within the club. Our data shows that contributions are significantly higher 
when exclusion is feasible and when the provision point is low. For the low provision point with 
exclusion, subjects overcontribute significantly with respect to the threshold and welfare improves. For 
the high provision point, exclusion lowers contributions and welfare (compared to no-exclusion). 
Furthermore, we found that exclusion stabilizes contribution over time. The unravelling of contributions 
in the baseline treatments does not show up in treatments with exclusion.Club goods (also called toll 
goods) are collective goods with the possibility of excluding individuals who fail to contribute.The 
possibility of exclusion  from the consumption of the public good has conflicting effects on welfare: on 
one hand it reduces the incentives to free ride, on the other hand it reduces the number of beneficiaries 
of the public good. Many clubs require a minimum number of members to be able to provide their 
activity (e.g., a farmer association, etc.). This step-level component can either be considered as a 
threshold for the provision of the club good itself, or as a threshold for maintaining some activity within 
an existing club. While previous experimental research focused on fundraising to provide non-existing 
public goods, we adopt in this work the second interpretation: the club good already exists and there is a 
step level for it’s maintenance. Aggregate contributions above the threshold constitute an improvement of 
the club services that benefit only to the club members. The game admits two Nash equilibria: to 
contribute the provision point and to contribute nothing. The first equilibrium involves a coordination 
problem. Furthermore, the game involves a social dilemma, since the social optimum is attained if all 
agents contribute their endowment. Our baseline treatment is a step level public good game with linear 
payoff above the threshold without money back guarantee. We compare three levels of provision point. 
Non-contributors are excluded but are informed about the amount of good produced within the club. 
Our data shows that contributions are significantly higher when exclusion is feasible and when the 
provision point is low. For the low provision point with exclusion, subjects overcontribute significantly 
with respect to the threshold and welfare improves. For the high provision point, exclusion lowers 
contributions and welfare (compared to no-exclusion). Furthermore, we found that exclusion stabilizes 
contribution over time. The unravelling of contributions in the baseline treatments does not show up in 
treatments with exclusion. 
Actes du quatrième atelier régional du projet Sirma 2 
Introduction 
The issue of public goods provision has received considerable attention by experimentalists. Most 
research was concerned with the case of pure public goods even though this is not the most relevant 
case in practice. Recently, a growing literature has started to investigate impure public goods by taking 
into account the possibility of exclusion. Different exclusion mechanisms have been examined so far. 
They are implemented in three ways: (i) a voting procedure (Gary and Chun-Lei, 2006; Margreiter, 
2004), (ii) an institutional rule, such as an endogenous threshold (Kocher et al., 2005), granting power 
to a leader (Levati et al., 2007), a serial cost share mechanism (Gailmard and Palfrey, 2005), or 
excluding the lowest contributors (Croson et al., 2006), or (iii) a selection rule implemented by the 
experimenter himself, to sort out types of contributors (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2000).   
In this research, we investigate another possibility of exclusion by means of club goods. Club goods 
(also called toll goods) are voluntary groups of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing at 
least one of the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics or a good characterized by 
excludable benefits. (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Among these features, voluntarism is an essential 
condition. “First, privately owned and operated clubs must be voluntary; members choose to belong 
because they anticipate a net benefit.” (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997). With the club goods, the 
Marginal Rate of Substitution between the private and the collective good (MRS) cannot be negative 
because of the right of the costless exit. The club is rejectable. An individual who does not obtain a net 
positive benefit from his contribution can choose not to partake (Ng, 1973). On the contrary, in a 
public good setting, an individual cannot exclude himself from the consumption of the public good. 
He undergoes the public good. (e.g.: a pacifist has to “consume” the defense policy entirely).  
Voluntary adhesion to a club good can be framed as a public good with an individual option to exit. A 
seminal experiment1 based on such a mechanism was run by Swope (2002). He explored voluntary 
adhesion with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) in a linear public good game. A minimum 
individual amount of contribution was required for an individual to benefit from the club good. By 
introducing voluntary adhesion in a linear public good, the n-player prisoner’s dilemma game is 
transformed into an n-player coordination game -a linear public good with minimum individual 
contribution-. Therefore, a subject’s task in the baseline treatment (standard VCM) was different from his 
task in the test treatment (voluntary adhesion). As a result, the observed differences in the distribution of 
contributions can be attributed both to task differences and to exclusion per se. Furthermore, Swope 
(2002) mixes two forms of contributions: a fee and free amounts. Therefore, the design fails to isolate the 
voluntary adhesion effect. The aim of our research is to examine voluntary adhesion in relation to the 
size property of club goods. In order to provide their activity, many clubs require a minimum number of 
members (e.g. an association). Such minimum size is critical for a club’s existence, and for maintaining a 
critical level of activity within an existing club. In both cases, either the club or its activity breaks down 
below this size. However, above the critical size, clubs can improve their services or their capacity (an 
association offers wider services, a swimming pool open longer).  
The provision of such club goods can be framed as a step level mechanism whereby group 
contributions are required to meet a threshold in order to provide the club. Below the threshold, the 
club good fails to exist. Several experiments relied on the step level mechanism to study fundraising 
and charitable giving. (Croson and Marks, 2001; List and Rondeau, 2003; Marks and Croson, 1998; 
Rondeau et al., 2005; Rose et al., 2002) In our experiment, this step-level mechanism will be 
interpreted as the minimum size of the club. In addition, we dot allow for rebates beyond the target 
(Marks and Croson, 1998) but, rather we assume linear provision of the club good above the threshold. 
The existence of a minimum size raises the question of what happens when the group contribution 
does not meet the threshold. Fundraising experiments allowed for refund, providing thereby incentives 
for subjects to increase their contribution. This is not relevant in our case. In reality, an individual 
cannot recover – or with difficulty –the time or money spent when the club fails to exist (e.g. an 
investor looses his investment when the firm gets bankrupt). Therefore contributions are lost when the 
club fails to exist.  
 
                                                     
1
 Orbell and Dawes (1986) conducted an experiment with the option to adhere or not to prisoner dilemma game.  They did not 
focus on the provision issue.  
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 in addition to capture the size feature of club goods, the step-level component, permits the investigation of 
voluntary adhesion within two coordination games. Therefore, it rules out the heterogeneous setting of 
Swope’s (2002) experiment. Besides, we suppressed the fee in our experiment. Therefore, we focus on a 
single form of contribution to the club good. Three levels of the threshold are compared in our experiment: 
low, medium and high.  While the low threshold requires only one player for providing the club, two are 
required in the medium case, and three are required in the high threshold case.  
Our experimental findings show that voluntary adhesion raises significantly group contributions, the success 
rate of provision and the groups’ welfare (except for the high threshold). Voluntary adhesion also increases 
the number of contributors, moderates cheap riding and sustains longer group contributions over time.   
The following section of this paper presents a model of voluntary adhesion to a club good and the 
theoretical predictions. Section 3 presents the experimental design and section 4 provides a discussion 
about our conjectures. Section 5 presents the results of the experiment. Section 6 discusses a possible 
explanation for our findings. The last section is a conclusion. 
Theory  
Let G be the amount of club good provided, xi agent i’s private good consumption, and wi his 
endowment. We assume that agent i’s utility is linear. Let us note gi = wi - xi agent i’s contribution to the 
club good (with wi > 0). Thus, 0>∂∂ ix
U , 0>∂∂ ig






U . Agent i faces an exclusion 
mechanism, λi. If he contributes to the provision of the club good, i.e. gi > 0, λi  = 1,and λi = 0 otherwise. 
When agent i becomes a member of the club his utility is U(xi, G), while U(wi, 0) applies if he stays 
outside the club. Obviously, agent i chooses to become a member if U(xi, G) > U(wi, 0).  The existence of 













otherwise. T is common knowledge. If the threshold is not met, contributions are lost, i.e. there 
is no Money Back Guarantee mechanism. Finally, beyond the threshold, the club good is provided 
linearly. It is the improvement of the club. Agent i faces a social dilemma towards this improvement; the 
marginal return of the club good β is inferior to the marginal return of the private good α i but nβ is larger 
than αi, where n is the number of contributors (0<n<N). In our experimental setting, we consider the 
symmetric case, where α i = α,  and wi = w for all i.  
 
The contribution game admits multiple Nash equilibria, but only two Nash equilibria in aggregate 






 with gi ≤ βT and gi > 0 are possible
2 equilibria. In the symmetric case, the equilibrium where 
G = T Pareto-dominates the equilibrium where G = 0. Agent i chooses gi as a best reply to the expected 
amount contributed by other players, g-i. The multiple non pareto-ranked Nash equilibria differ with 
respect to the cost-sharing rule in providing the step-level good. In contrast to the standard linear public 
                                                     
2
 Depending on the choice of parameters. Section 2 (Experimental design) details the Nash equilibria of each level of threshold.  
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good game, the step level good involves coordination issue and cheap riding as opposed to free riding. 
However, the Pareto dominated equilibrium does not involve a coordination issue. It is a best reply for 
player i to choose gi = 0 if he expects that g-i= 0.   
 
 
The group optimum is achieved whenever all players contribute their endowment to the club good 
since n β > α. A player has no incentive to contribute more than the Nash equilibrium because α > β: 
the marginal return of one unit from the private good is superior to the marginal return of one unit from 
the club good (Equation 1). Since agents who do not contribute to the club good are excluded, 
contributing 0 no longer constitutes the free riding strategy. Instead, the player contributes the 
minimum unit in order to become a member of the club. Such behavior corresponds to “free riding” in 
the context of the provision of a club good: contribute, but the least possible amount, in order to 
benefit from the club. In our experiment, subjects allocate integer amounts. Therefore, the minimum 
contribution level is 1 token.  
Experimental design  
The baseline treatment is a linear public good game with a threshold. Each subject i has an initial 
endowment of w = 20 tokens that he can allocate (in integer amounts) between a private account and 
a collective account. The private account yields a marginal return α = 1 per token invested. The 
collective account provides a marginal return β = 0.5 per token invested if the target T is met. If the 
target level is not met, subject’s contributions are lost. If the group contributions are above the 
threshold, each contributor enjoys the total amount of the club good provided. We compare three 
levels of threshold: Low threshold (15 tokens), medium threshold (30 tokens) and high threshold (60 
tokens). In the first case, a single subject can provide the club good, in the second one at least two 
subjects are required to reach the threshold and in the high threshold three members of the group are 
required to reach the 60 tokens. Note that, since we are considering a step level continuously provided 
above the threshold and that subjects homogenously value the provision of the club good, the step 
return does not vary between the thresholds (Croson and Marks, 2000). As a consequence, we are 
comparing the different thresholds within a homogenous return setting. Table I summarizes parameters 
of the experiment. 
We compare the baseline treatment to the voluntary adhesion treatment. Treatments allowing for 
voluntary adhesion follow the same baseline design with a minor change: subjects are excluded from 
the benefit of the club good if they fail to contribute. Since we expect that voluntary adhesion can 
affect the level of contribution, careful attention was given to the instructions in order to prevent any 
design effect on contributions. Instructions were written in a neutral way, avoiding words like 
“investment” or “contributions”. Instead we chose words like “put”, “budget” and “account”.   
The experiment was run at the University of Montpellier I, with a large subject pool of volunteers from 
various disciplines: economics, law, art, psychology, literature, medicine, engineering, and sport. Care 
was taken to ensure that no subject participated in more than one session. 352 students participated to 
our experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Upon attending the experimental lab, the 16 participants of each session were 
randomly assigned to groups of 4 players in a partner design. A public reading of the instructions 
followed a private one in order to make the rules of the game common knowledge. Subjects had to 
make tow decisions: how many tokens to invest in their private account and how many tokens to 
invest in the collective account. The history of the past interactions was available for each subject at 
any time during the experiment. The constituent game was repeated 25 periods. Accumulated point 
earnings over the 25 periods were converted into Euros at the end of the experiment at a publicly 




Mostaganem, Algérie, 26-28 mai 2008 5
Table I. Experimental parameter.  
 (a) Number of contributors required to reach the threshold; (b) Benefit /cost = 
T
Tnβ
; (c) Money Back Guarantee. 
For the high threshold, all contribution vectors that reach exactly the threshold are Nash equilibria. A 
player invests collectively whenever he predicts that the other members of his group will contribute at 
least 40 tokens. (15, 15, 15, 15) is therefore a symmetrical equilibrium (gi = T/n) around which a group of 
non-communicating people might be expected to coalesce. The contribution vector (1, 20, 20, 19) 
constitutes a Nash equilibrium that maximizes player’s 1 Nash benefits. It yields 49 points. Player 2 and 
player 3 earn the minimum Nash benefits when a club good is provided, 30 points. The contribution 
vector (0, 20, 20, 20) is the equivalent vector maximizing Nash earning for player 1 in the public good 
case (50 points).  
Again, for the low threshold, all contribution vectors equalling 15 tokens do not constitute Nash 
equilibria. A player contributes to the collective account when other members of the group invest at least 
8 tokens. The minimum Nash earning for a player is obtained when he contributes 7 tokens to the 
collective account. It yields 20.5 points – when the step level good is provided -. The maximum Nash 
earning is obtained when other members of the group invest 14 tokens (15 tokens for the baseline) and 
the player contributes 1 token (0 token for the baseline). It yields 26.5 points in the voluntary adhesion 
treatment and 27.5 points in the baseline treatment.  
Conjectures  
For the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment, the Nash prediction for selfish players is that the 
group contribution is either equal to the threshold level or to zero contributions. Since zero contribution 
is Pareto dominated by the threshold Nash equilibria, we expect that subjects will coordinate on the 
threshold in both treatments. Moreover, since the threshold is common knowledge the symmetrical 
equilibrium constitutes a focal point (Schelling, 1980). Our first conjecture is thus:  
Conjecture 1: Groups coordinate on the symmetric Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium 
in the baseline and in the voluntary adhesion treatments  
Increasing the threshold affects the risk associated with strategies consistent with the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. Since larger contributions are required to reach the threshold, higher potential losses are 
involved because of the no refund rule. Thus, with a higher threshold, subjects might become more 
reluctant to contribute. This is known as the assurance problem hypothesis (Isaac et al., 1989). However, 
a higher threshold yields also larger benefits. In our setting the reward of provision is correlated to the 
threshold level: 7.5 points in the low threshold, 15 points for the medium and 30 points for the high 
threshold. The subject contributes more but earns more from the collective good. Hence, the threshold is 
likely to lead to larger contributions by subjects. Summarizing, there are two opposite effects when the 
threshold is increased: the assurance problem becomes more dramatic, leading to lower contributions, 
the reward of the club becomes larger leading to higher contributions.  
 







Low 15 1 6 2 No 
Medium 30 2 5 2 No Baseline 
High 60 3 4 2 No 
Low 15 1 8 2 No 
Medium 30 2 6 2 No 
Voluntary  
adhesion 
High 60 3 4 2 No 
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Earlier experiments provide mixed evidence about these effects. Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) showed 
that the threshold has no effect on contributions when random endowments are assigned to subjects. 
Cadsby and Maynes (1999) found that contributions decline with the threshold level with a constant 
reward and no rebates setting. The main finding however, is a tendency for contributions to increase 
(decrease) with the threshold at low (high) threshold levels (Bougherara et al., 2007; Dawes et al., 1986; 
Isaac et al., 1989; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992). These findings are consistent with the fact that the 
assurance problem effect becomes relatively stronger for high threshold levels while the “earning effect” 
is relatively stronger for low threshold levels. Therefore, as the threshold increases, individuals first 
increase their contribution up to some level of the threshold where they move in the opposite direction, 
with a switching point that varies according to the individual’s preferences.  
Conjecture 2: Increasing the threshold from the low to the medium threshold 
increases group contributions. Increasing the threshold form the medium to the high 
level decreases contributions 
Introducing voluntary adhesion excludes contribution vectors where players invest 0 tokens. As a 
consequence, the number of possible equilibrium contribution vectors is lower in the voluntary adhesion 
treatment than in the baseline. Actually the set of equilibria under voluntary adhesion is included in the 
larger set of equilibria of the baseline treatment. As a result, a subject’s expectation about others’ 
contributions is affected: less uncertainty is involved and so there are fewer possibilities for coordination 
failure. The problem faced by our player is close to the tacit coordination experiment of Van Huyck et al. 
(1990) but in a context of non-Pareto ranked equilibria. 
Furthermore, when all subjects of the group decide to adhere to the club i.e. 4 tokens contributed, 
subjects are guaranteed that at least 26.66% of the Nash equilibrium will be provided in the low 
threshold, 13.33% in the medium threshold and 6.66% in the high threshold. In contrast, subjects’ 
expectations in the baseline treatment do not involve such guarantee in reaching the threshold. Thus, 
voluntary adhesion reduces the strategic uncertainty of the coordination task.  
Conjecture 3 : Voluntary adhesion increases the success of provision 
The voluntary adhesion prediction differs from the baseline prediction by the exclusion of the 
contribution vectors where one or more players contribute 0 token. Therefore, the number of players in 
the voluntary adhesion equilibrium is always equal to 4 players. In the baseline treatment, contribution 
vectors with 2 or 3 players free ride5 are possible Nash equilibria.  
Conjecture 4: Voluntary adhesion increases the number of contributors. 
In the next section, we present the results of our experiment with respect to these conjectures.  
Results  
We report in Table II the general pattern of the results. It depicts by treatment (baseline and voluntary 
adhesion) and for each threshold (low, medium and high) the individual and the group level of 
contribution, the success rate of provision and the welfare. The success rate of provision is the 
percentage of success of provision of the step-level good. It is equal to the number of times group 
contributions reach at least the threshold divided by the number of periods. Hereafter, we will call the 
success rate of provision simply “success rate”. The welfare is equal to the final monetary payment of the 
subjects.  
                                                     
5 Contribution vectors for which the group contribution is equal to the threshold and for which two or three players free-ride are 
not necessarily Nash equilibria. In the medium threshold, there exists only one equilibrium contribution vector where exactly two 
players free ride (15, 15, 0, 0). The contribution vectors  (16, 14, 0, 0), (17, 13, 0, 0), (18, 12, 0, 0),  (19, 11, 0, 0) and (20, 10, 0, 0) 
are not equilibria because player 1 is always better off if he deviates (a similar arguments holds for the permutation of these 
vectors).  The same remark holds for the low threshold: (15, 0, 0, 0) , (14, 1, 0 , 0),  (13, 2, 0 , 0), (12, 3, 0 , 0) , (11, 4, 0 , 0),  (10, 
5, 0 , 0),  (9, 6, 0 , 0),  (8, 7, 0 , 0) are not Nash equilibrium vectors. For the high threshold, all vectors for which the agregate 
contribution is equal to the threshold are Nash equilibria. One player can free ride in the high threshold, i.e. is for the contribution 
vector (20, 20, 20, 0) and permutations of it.  
Mostaganem, Algérie, 26-28 mai 2008 7
The econometric analysis conducted in this section follow this scheme. First, we compare the baseline 
treatment and the voluntary adhesion treatment using non-parametric tests: a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test or a two-sided χ2 test depending on the variable (qualitative or quantitative). Then, we 
control for the differences between the two treatments with a GLS panel
6
 data regression with random 
effects
7
. The dependent variable is defined specifically for each analysis. When it is a binary variable, 
e.g. success of provision, we run a logit regression on panel data. Unless reported otherwise, the 
regressors are a dummy treatment taking value 1 for the voluntary adhesion (0 for the baseline) and a 
time variable. They are denoted Voluntary adhesion and Period. We correct for heteroskedasticity and 
auto-correlation each time it was detected
8
. We conclude for a significant statistical effect when both the 
non-parametric tests and the panel data regression agree. Finally, the rejection threshold of the null 
hypothesis is at 5%. 
Table II. Descriptive statistics. 
(a) The symmetrical equilibrium is 3.75 for the low threshold, 7.5 for the medium threshold and 15 tokens for the high 
threshold. 
(b) Success rate = Number of times groups reach the threshold / Number of periods. 
(c) Welfare = Total points accumulated at the end of the experiment. (1 token in the private account = 1 point ; 1 token in 
the collective account = 0.5 point). 
Result 1: Mixed results are observed for the Nash prediction. Neither the baseline nor 
the voluntary adhesion are better described by the Pareto dominant equilibrium  
Conjecture 1 states that groups will play the symmetrical Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. To examine this 
conjecture, we report in Table III the percentage of Nash equilibria in each treatment. It is equal to the 
number of times group contributions reach exactly the threshold divided by the number of times group 
contributions reach at least the threshold (Cf. Section 3 Experimental design for the vector of contribution 
constituting a Nash equilibrium) Clearly, groups coordinate few times on the threshold. We perform a two-
sided 9 Student test (T test) to compare group contributions in each threshold and in each treatment to the 
threshold level. If the prediction was verified, we have checked if players opted for a symmetrical strategy as 
a solution of coordination on the threshold 10. The T test shows that in the low threshold, group contributions 
                                                     
6 We check the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity with a Breusch and Pagan LM test before each panel data 
regression. The tests confirm the significant presence of individual effects and thus the relevance of the data as a panel structure.  
7 Random effects were preferred over fixed effects for two reasons: first, they allow for regressors that do not vary over time 
(dummy variable) and second, the GLS estimator corrects for multiple observations from a single group of subjects (Greene, 2003) 
8 For all regressions we check for the existence of auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity : If only heteroskedasticity was detected 
(White test) we correct by running FGLS with a variance covariance matrix of the errors allowing for heteroskedasticity. If only 
intra-individual autocorrelation (Breusch and Pagan LM test) or inter-individual autocorrelation was detected (Wooldridge test) or 
both simultaneously, we correct by a GLS random effects regression with a Durban-Watson coefficient. Finally, if both 
heteroskedasticity and any form of auto-correlation was detected, we correct by running a FGLS with a modified matrix of 
covariance of the errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. See for a discussion of hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation under panel data. (Baltagi, 1995) 
9 If the two-sided T test shows that the group contributions is not equal to the Nash equilibrium, we conduct a one sided T test to 
determine if group contributions is significantly lower or higher than the Nash equilibrium.  
10 We run a two-sided T test to compare individual contribution to 3.75 tokens in the low threshold, 7.5 tokens in the medium and 
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in the baseline treatment are significantly equal to 15 tokens (t=0.52; p=0.59) and subjects coordinate 
around the symmetrical equilibrium (t=0.52 ; p=0.59). However, for the voluntary adhesion treatment, group 
contributions are significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium (t=7.35; p<0.01). For the medium threshold, 
group contributions are significantly lower than the Nash equilibrium in the baseline treatment (t=-2.89; 
p<0.01) and are significant equal in the voluntary adhesion treatment (t=1.05; p=0.29). Again, subjects do 
coordinate around the symmetrical Nash equilibrium (t=1.28; p=0.09). Lastly, in the high threshold, Nash 
prediction is not significant for both treatments: the baseline treatment (t=-9.32; p<0.01) and the voluntary 
adhesion (t=-12.01; p<0.01). Hence, mixed results are found when we compare group contributions to the 
Nash prediction. Neither the baseline nor the voluntary adhesion is better predicted by the Nash equilibrium. 
However, in both treatments when subjects coordinate on the threshold the symmetrical solution is selected. 
Conjecture 1 is therefore partially confirmed.  







(a) Percentage of Nash equilibria = Number of Nash equilibria11 / Number of times group contributions reach at least 
the threshold. 
Result 2: Increasing the threshold from the low to the medium threshold increases 
significantly group contributions. However, contributions remain significantly 
unchanged from the medium to the high threshold  
Conjecture 2 states an increase of contributions from the low to the medium threshold and a decrease 
of contributions from the medium to the high threshold. We first examine the group contributions. 
Then, we address the success of provision. We conduct a Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon12 test to compare 
the increase of group contributions from the low to the medium threshold and from the medium to the 
high threshold. We perform these tests separately for the baseline and for the voluntary adhesion 
treatment. The test shows that there is a significant increase from the low threshold to the medium 
threshold in the baseline (U=-5.37; p<0.01) and in the voluntary adhesion treatment (U=-5.41; 
p<0.01). However, there is no difference between group contributions of the medium and the high 
threshold in the baseline (U= -1.40; p=0.15) or in the voluntary adhesion treatment (U=1.24; p=0.21). 
We then conduct a panel data regression with group contributions as the dependent variable. The 
regressors are a threshold dummy variable and time. We interpret our results with respect to the low 
threshold. The regression is conducted separately for the baseline and for the voluntary adhesion 
treatment. We report results in Table IV. It outlines that the increase of group contributions from the 
low to the medium threshold is significant whereas from the low to the high is not significant. This 
finding is observed for the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment. Thus, the regression 
confirms the U test. Mixed evidences are therefore observed for conjecture 2. The increase of 
contributions13 from the low to the medium threshold is significant but contributions do not drop from 




                                                                                                                                                                     
15 tokens in the high. 
11 Cf. Experimental design. 
12 Hereafter we will call the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test the U test. 
13 We also examined the variation of the success rate with respect to the threshold level. Results are reported in Appendix 2.1.. In 
the baseline treatment, there is no significant difference of the success rate between the three levels of threshold. In the voluntary 
adhesion treatment, there is only a significant decrease of the success rate from the medium to the high threshold. Thus, in 
comparison to group contributions, the success rate seems little correlated to the threshold level (except for the voluntary adhesion 
treatment previously pointed out). 
 Baseline Voluntary adhesion 
Low (T=15) 4.6 % 6.0% 
Medium (T=30) 1.9% 4.8% 
High (T=60) 4% 9% 
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Table IV. Results from panel data regression explaining group contributions in the pooled sample (Low + 














*): significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a) T-statistics 
are in parentheses; (b) The low threshold dummy variable is dropped; Regressions are corrected for heteroske-
dasticity and autocorrelation. 
Result 3: Voluntary adhesion significantly increases group contributions, success of 
provision and welfare, except for the high threshold  
Figures 1, 2 and 3 depict the evolution of group contributions over time. A visual inspection shows that 
voluntary adhesion increases group contributions in the low threshold and in the medium one. There is 
no clear effect for the high threshold: Average group contributions in the voluntary adhesion treatment 
are lower than average group contributions in the baseline treatment during the main part of the game 
(until the period 17). However, it rises during the 8 last periods and becomes higher than Average group 
contributions of the baseline treatment. Hereafter, we first wonder about the statistical significance of this 
graphical interpretation. Then about its consequences on the related outcomes: the success of provision 
and the welfare.  
Starting this analysis with the variable group contributions, the U test shows that group contributions is 
significantly higher in the voluntary adhesion treatment for the low threshold (U=-5.71 ; p<0.01) and for 
the medium threshold (U=-3.32 ; p<0.01). In the high threshold, group contributions do not change 
between the two treatments (U=1.27; p=0,20). Then, we run the panel data regression. We explain group 
contributions –the dependent variable- by a dummy treatment Voluntary adhesion and we control for 
learning by introducing time with the variable period. Voluntary adhesion and Period are our regressors. 
A significant dummy regressor Voluntary adhesion indicates a significant increase – or decrease - of the 
group contributions. A significant regressor Period points out if the increase/decrease of the group 
contributions is stable or varies over time. Table V reports the results of the regression. It reveals that 
group contributions significantly increase in the low and the medium threshold but are not affected in the 





Regressors Baseline Voluntary adhesion 








Threshold_high (b) -- -- 




Log likelihood -1404 -1466 
Number of observation 400 425 
Number of groups 16 17 
Time periods 25 25 






















At least one subject to reach the threshold
Low threshold
 













Figure 2. Average group contributions (T=30). 
 
                                                     
15 We display the median group contributions instead of the average group contributions because of the high level of group 





















At least two subjects to reach the threshold
Medium threshold
 























At least three subjects to reach the threshold
High threshold
 
Figure 3. Average group contributions (T=60). 
 
Table V. Results from panel data regression explaining group contributions for each level of threshold (a) . 
Regressors  T=15 T=30 T=60 

















Log likelihood -1118 -978 -643 
Number of observation 350 275 200 
Number of groups 14 11 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; 
(a): T-statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Next, we perform the same analysis with the success of provision. The success is a binary variable taking 
value 1 when group contributions reach at least the threshold and 0 when it is lower than the threshold. 
We recall that the success rate is the percentage of the success of provision of the step-level good. Table 
II outlines that the success of provision increases from the baseline to the voluntary adhesion treatment 
by 32.2% in the low threshold and by 28.0% in the medium threshold. In the high threshold, it decreases 
by 9.0%. A Chi2 test shows that voluntary adhesion increases significantly the success rate for the low 
threshold ( 2χ =36.86; p<0.01) and for the medium threshold. ( 2χ =22.33; p<0.01). In the high 
threshold, there is no significant change between the two treatments ( 2χ =1.79; p=0.18). We then run a 
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logit regression with random effects. Success, the binary variable, is the dependent variable. The 
regressors are Voluntary adhesion and Period. Table VI reports the output of the regression. It indicates 
that the significant sign of Voluntary adhesion is positive meaning that there is an increase of the success 
of provision in the voluntary adhesion. Table VI also indicates that the success of provision declines over 
time since the sign of Period is negative. Hence, the regression confirms the results of the statistical test.  
Table VI. Results from panel data regression explaining success of provision for each level of threshold (a). 
Regressors T=15 T=30 T=60 
Intercept 1.34 (***) 
(1.74) 
-- -- 










    
Log likelihood -153.27 -164.78 -- 
    
Number of observation 350 275 200 
Number of groups 14 11 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a): T-
statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Table VII. Results from panel data regression explaining welfare for each level of threshold (a). 
Regressors T=15 T=30 T=60 


















Log likelihood -1286 -1193 -969 
Number of observation 350 275 200 
Number of groups 14 11 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**) : significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant ; (a) T-
statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
In the baseline treatment when the step level public good is reached, it benefits all the subjects. In the 
voluntary adhesion treatment, it benefits only the contributors. Does this exclusion of the benefactors 
have an effect on welfare? To test this proposition, we have considered final monetary payment as an 
indicator of the welfare difference. With a U test, we compare earnings of the subjects in the baseline 
and voluntary adhesion treatment. It  shows that the increase of the welfare in the voluntary adhesion 
treatment compared to the baseline is statistically significant for the low (U=-3.30 ; p=0,00) and the 
medium threshold (U=-2.30 ; p=0.02). However, welfare in the high threshold is significantly higher in 
the baseline than in the voluntary adhesion threshold (U=2.72; p<0.01). Results of the regression 
explaining welfare – the dependent variable - with the same previous regressors are reported in Table V. 
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Voluntary adhesion is significant and positive indicating an increase of welfare in the regression of the 
low and the medium threshold. This finding confirms the statistical U-test and are consistent with the 
previous increase of the group contributions and the success rate. The panel regression reveals also that 
the welfare decreases for the high threshold. The statistical U test result is thus confirmed.  
Thus, voluntary adhesion increases group contributions, success of provision and welfare when the 
threshold is low or medium. Conjecture 3 is therefore confirmed for these two levels of threshold. However, 
for the high threshold level conjecture 3 is not confirmed.  See section 6 for a discussion of these findings. 
 
Result 4: Voluntary adhesion increases the number of contributors and decreases 
cheap riding, except for the high threshold 
Hereafter we aim to examine Conjecture 4. Figure 4 depicts the number of contributor per group for each 
period for the low threshold16. Clearly, a visual inspection indicates more contributors per group in the 
voluntary adhesion treatment than in the baseline. A χ2 test to comparison shows a significant increase in 
the low (χ2 = 153.31; p<0.01) and the medium threshold (χ2 = 67.28; p<0.01). However, the test reveals 
no significant difference in the high threshold (χ2 = 6.26; p=0.18). We run a regression explaining the 
number of contributors per group in each period. The regressors are Voluntary adhesion and Period. 
Table VIII reports the results of the regression. Voluntary adhesion is significant and positive in the low 
and the medium threshold. Voluntary adhesion increases by two players the number of contributors in 
the low threshold and by one player in the medium threshold. This increase is not significant for the high 
threshold. The statistical tests are thus confirmed by the regression. Our conjecture 3 is confirmed for the 










Figure 4. Percentage of contributors per group (T=15). 
Is this increase of the number of contributors is accompanied by a decrease of cheap riding17?  To answer 
this question we first compare the individual contribution in the baseline and the voluntary adhesion 
treatment. Then, we compare strictly positive contributed amounts between the two treatments; that is 
we drop from the observations free riders in the baseline and subjects who excluded themselves in the 
voluntary adhesion treatment. 
The U test shows that subjects contribute significantly more in the voluntary adhesion treatment than in 
the baseline treatment when consider positive amounts. We observe this increase for the low (U=-12.63 ; 
p<0.01) and the medium threshold (U=-5.23 ; p<0.01) but not for the high threshold where there is no 
significant difference (U=0.95 ; p=0.33). When we consider strictly positive amounts, we find that 
individuals contribute significantly more in the baseline than in the voluntary adhesion treatment. (Low 
U =5.13 ; p<0.01) and medium U=4.88 ; p<0.01) In the baseline treatment, a few generous individuals 
                                                     
16 See Appendix 2.9. and 2.10. for the medium threshold and 11 and 12 the high thresholds.  








0 1 2 3 4
Baseline Voluntary adhesion
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provide the public good whereas in the voluntary adhesion treatment all the subjects provides the club 
good but with less effort. We report in Table X the results of the regression.18 We explain individual 
contribution by the regressors Voluntary adhesion and Period. Table IX indicates that voluntary adhesion 
decreases individual contribution by 1.30 tokens in the low threshold, and 1.69 tokens in the medium 
threshold. It does not have an effect in the high threshold as the U-test already indicated. This result 
suggests that the increase of the number of contributors is accompanied by a decrease of individual 
contributions. Subjects seem to coordinate better in the voluntary adhesion treatment. 
Table VIII. Results from panel data regressions explaining the number of contributors per group for each 
level of threshold (a). 
Regressors T=15 T=30 T=60 

















Log likelihood -217. 71 -369.99 -175.43 
Number of observation 350 275 200 
Number of groups 14 11 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a) : T-
statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Table IX. Results from panel data regression explaining individual contribution for each level of threshold (a). 
 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant;(a) : T-statistics are in 
parentheses; (b) : Strictly positive contributions (Free riders and auto-excluded subjects are dropped in each period) ; Regressions 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
                                                     
18 The number of the remaining observations is reported at the bottom of the table.  
21 Total variance can also be break down to intragroup variance and intergroup variance. See Sevestre (2002) for further discussion. 
T=15 T=30 T=60 
Regressors 
Contribution  Cheap_(b) Contribution Cheap_(b) Contribution Cheap_(b) 












Voluntary adhesion 2.89 (*) 
(14.06) 






















Log likelihood -4029 -2949 -3199 -2368 -2293 -1202 
Number of 
observation 
1400 989 1100 799 800 433 
Number of subjects 56 53 44 44 32 29 
Time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 
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(3) 
 Result 5: Voluntary adhesion decreases weakly the variance of group contributions.   
Do voluntary adhesion affects the variance of group contributions? Let Gjt denotes the group 
contributions. It depends on the group j 1,..,J and on the period t 1,…,T. Equation 2 represents the total 
variance of group contributions. 
 
   
Equation 2 can be broken down as follow:  
 
The total variance of group contributions is composed by intertemporal variance and intratemporal 
variance21. The first term of the equation 3 represents intertemporal variance. It is the variance of group 
contributions between periods. It yields 25 observations per treatment. The second one stands for 
intratemporal variance. It is the variance of group contributions for each period and for each group. It 
yields 150 observations per treatment (for a treatment with 6 groups).  
To compare the intertemporal variance between the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment, we run 
a U test. It shows that voluntary adhesion does not affect the intertemporel variance of group contributions 
for the low (U=-0.98 ; p=0.32) and the medium threshold (U=-0.99 ; p=0.31). However, it decreases 
intertemporal variance of the high threshold (U=2.94; p<0.01). We do not have sufficient observations to 
run a panel data regression in order to confirm this analysis (only 25 observations). In the second case, - 
intratemporal group contributions variance – the U test shows that it is significant only for the medium 
threshold (U=3.72; p<0.01). For the low (U= 1.54; p=0.12) and the high threshold (U=0.06; p=0.94) 
intratemporal variance does not vary. Then, we run a panel data regression with a dependent variable equal 
to the squared difference between the group contributions for each period and the total average group 
contributions22. The regressors are Voluntary adhesion and Period. Table X reports the results. Voluntary 
adhesion is negative and significant for the medium threshold and not significant for the low and the high 
threshold. Thus, the regression confirms the results of the statistical test. On the whole, voluntary adhesion 
affects the variance of group contributions only for the medium and the high threshold: it decreases the 
intertemporal variance of the high threshold and the intratemporal variance of the medium threshold. But it 
does not decrease the total variance of group contributions in any threhsold.  
Table X. Results from panel data regression explaining the intratemporal variance of group contributions 
for each level of threshold (a). 
Regressors T=15 T=30 T=60 





Voluntary adhesion -- -101.65 (*) 
(-2.64) 
-- 






Log likelihood -2143 -1817 -1376 
Number of observation 350 275 200 
Number of groups 14 11 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
 
(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a): T-
statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
                                                     








= =1 1   ; t stands for the number of periods t=1,…,T and j for the number of groups per 
treatment j=1,…,J.  
(2)
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Result 6: Voluntary adhesion raises the asymptotic group contributions in the low and 
the medium threshold 
We aim to examine the convergence of group contributions. Do group contributions in the baseline 
treatment converge to the same level of group contributions in the voluntary adhesion treatment ? Do 
group contributions converge to the Nash equilibrium ? We carry out the following regression (Equation 
4). It is inspired from Camera et al. (2003). We explain group contributions Gjt (the dependent variable) 
by an inverse function of time 1/t  (the regressor) where j stands for groups of players, t for time uj for the 
group effect and εjt for the error term. 
                             ε jtjjt uGGG t +++= ∞ 10                                         (4)  
where j = 1 , 2,.., J  and  t = 1 , 2,.., 25  
As t becomes large, 1/t gets negligible. Thus, the intercept, G∞ represents the asymptotic group contributions. 
At the opposite, G∞ + G0 represents the group contributions at the initial period. We report in Table XI the 
results of the regression. Clearly, all the intercepts are different indicating a different level of asymptotic 
group contributions between the public good and the club good. Table XI also points out a higher intercept 
for the voluntary adhesion treatment in the low (+6.84 tokens) and the medium threshold (+8.15 tokens) but 
a lower one for the high threshold (-2.08 tokens). Finally, the regression indicates that none of the treatments 
converge toward the Nash equilibrium except for the medium threshold in the voluntary adhesion treatment.  
We further our analysis by examining more specifically convergence toward the threshold. We 
conducted a similar analysis to that of Marks and Croson (1998). We calculate the squared distance of 
the threshold of each group for each period. It is our dependant variable. We explain this difference by a 
non-linear function of time Period + Period_squared. A negative significant coefficient of the regressor 
Period means the existence of a convergence to the threshold while a significant positive sign means the 
existence of a divergence from the threshold. In addition, a significant coefficient of Period_squared 
means that the convergence/divergence is non linear. Table XII outlines the result of the regression per 
treatment. Period is significant for all the voluntary adhesion treatments. It is negative for the low and the 
medium threshold - indicating a convergence to the Nash equilbrium - and positive for the high 
threshold –indicating a divergence-. Period_square is positive meaning that the convergence slows over 
time. The divergence is linear since Period_square is not significant. For the baseline treatment, all the 
regressors Period are not significant. Group contributions do not significantly converge to the threshold23. 




(*):   significant at 1% level ; (**) : significant at 5% level ; (***) : significant at 10% level; -- non significant  ; (a) : T-
statistics are in parentheses (b)  ( ) jtjjt utGGG ε+++= ∞ 1*0    where j=1,2,..,J  and t=1,2,..,25  ;  (c) R2 overall GLS 
regressions; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
                                                     
23 We run the same convergence analysis toward 0 (the Pareto dominated Nash equilibrium) for the high threshold. We find that in both treatments, 
convergence toward 0 is significant for the high threshold. This is consistent with the divergence from the threshold pointed out in Table 11.  
Regressors






























Log likelihood 6.5%(c) -662 -564 -491 6.2%(c) 4.1% 
Number of 
observation 
150 200 150 125 100 100 
Number of groups 6 8 6 5 4 4 
Time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 




(*):   significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant;  
(a): T-statistics are in parentheses ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Discussion  
We aim in this section to support that the reduction of the strategic uncertainty by voluntary adhesion is 
the origin of the higher effective results observed in the voluntary adhesion treatment.  
Our experiment reveals that voluntary adhesion improves success of provision, group contributions and 
welfare in the low and the medium threshold. However, in the high threshold, there is no difference 
between the baseline and the voluntary adhesion treatment. Conjecture 3 states that when all subjects of 
the group decide to adhere to the club i.e. 4 tokens contributed, subjects are guaranteed that at least 
26.66% of the Nash equilibrium will be provided in the low threshold, 13.33% in the medium threshold 
and 6.66% in the high threshold. As a consequence, it is in the lowest threshold that the voluntary 
adhesion reduces the maximum strategic uncertainty. This is consistent with our findings: The most 
effective results are observed first with the low threshold, then with the medium threshold and finally 
with the high threshold.  
To support our hypothesis we ran another experiment where we stressed the reduction of the strategic 
uncertainty: we imposed a minimum contribution level (10 tokens) to benefit of the club good in the 
high threshold setting (Recall in the high threshold the baseline and the voluntary adhesion get the 
same results). Now, subjects need to add “only” 5 tokens to reach the symmetrical equilibrium 
whereas they previously needed 14 tokens.  The same experimental design is replicated. Figure 5 
depicts the average group contributions over time. Clearly, a visual inspection shows that voluntary 
adhesion with a minimum level of 10 tokens increases the level of group contributions. We perform 
the same panel data regression as previously to examine group contributions, success of provision and 
welfare. The output is reported in the Table XIII. Voluntary adhesion is positive and significant 
confirming statistically the visual inspection of the figure. The voluntary adhesion treatment does 
increase the group contributions, the success of provision in the high threshold. Hence, manipulating 
the minimum contribution parameter permits us to vary the strategic level of uncertainty of the game 
and to support our hypothesis.  










































-- -1349 -1024 -713 -1487 -764 
Number of 
observation 150 200 150 125 100 100 
Number of 
groups 
6 8 6 5 4 4 
Time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Table XIII. Results from panel data regression explaining threshold convergence for each treatment (a).
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Baseline
Voluntary adhesion (1 token min)
Voluntary adhesion (10 tokens min)
y=60 : Threshold
Minium of three subjects to reach the threshold
High threshold
 
Figure 5. Average group contributions (T=60). 
Table XIII. Results from panel data regressions explaining group contributions, success of provision and 
welfare for the high threshold  (with minimum contribution) (a). 
 
Regressors Group contributions Success of provision (b) Welfare 
Intercept  35.42 (*) 
(9.22) 
-- 22.05 (*) 
(33.29) 






Log likelihood  -652 -111 - 2965 
Number of observation 200 200 200 
Number of groups 8 8 8 
Time periods 25 25 25 
 (*):   Significant at 1% level; (**): significant at 5% level; (***): significant at 10% level; -- non significant; (a): T-
statistics are in parentheses (b): Logit regression ; (c) dummy variable taking value 1 for the voluntary adhesion 
treatment. ; Regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Conclusion 
Club goods are characterized by voluntarism. An individual has the option to exclude himself from the 
provision of the club. Club goods are also characterized by their size. It fails to exist when there are not 
enough members or contributions, and, above this critical size, the club can improve its services or 
capacity. In this work, we investigate voluntary adhesion through the size issue by introducing a step-
level mechanism. Our setting permits us to examine voluntary adhesion within two coordination games. 
We compare three levels of threshold, each time with and without voluntary adhesion.  
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Our experiment reveals that voluntary adhesion significantly increases group contributions, success of 
provision and welfare (except for the high threshold). Besides, our findings are consistent with the 
theoretical prediction; voluntary adhesion does increase the number of contributors. The use of step-level 
goods raises the additional issue of “cheap riding.”  –i.e. the implicit cost-sharing rule in reaching the 
provision point-. Our experiment shows that voluntary adhesion reduces cheap riding; while in the 
baseline treatment a few generous subjects contribute the bulk of the group contributions, in the 
voluntary adhesion treatment the effort to provide the threshold is more fairly distributed among the 
subjects. Finally, the experiment reveals that group contributions sustain longer in time in the voluntary 
adhesion treatment than in the baseline treatment. In particular, group contributions in the voluntary 
adhesion treatment of the medium threshold converge to the Nash equilibrium.  
A possible explanation to our result is the decrease of the strategic uncertainty by voluntary adhesion. 
Voluntary adhesion guarantees the achievement of a percentage of the Nash equilibrium when members 
decide to adhere to the club. This percentage is maximal when the threshold is low (26.66% of the 
provision of the Nash equilibrium). The most effective results are observed for this setting. Imposing a 
minimum level of contribution to stress the reduction of the strategic uncertainty (66.66% of the 
provision of the Nash equilibrium) confirms our hypothesis. It raises the success rate of provision in the 
high threshold from 30.0% to 83.0%. Voluntary adhesion is an incentive to decrease the coordination 
failure.   
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